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Abstract:  
Whilst there is no shortage of analyses on the politics of regions in International Relations, little 
attention has been paid to states who perceive that they do not properly fit in the regions they 
happen to be located in. These are the ‘misplaced states’: they stand out not so much because of 
material capacities but because they espouse an identity, manifested in different ways, in marked 
contrast to the states around them. This article asks what causes this process of a change in 
identity amongst misplaced states in different parts of the world. Comparing across regions, it 
analyses why and how states reconstruct their identities in order to enhance or deemphasise their 
degrees of regional conformity. By focusing on the ‘role-location process’ rooted in role theory, 
this article contributes to the literature by conceptualising the phenomenon of ‘misplacement.’ A 
state is misplaced when there is mismatch between its aspirations and others’ expectations for it. 
The article also details how and why misplacement occurs and studies its implications both for 
the states in question as well as for the politics of their geographical regions. 
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Introduction 
About ten years ago, when a visiting German professor teaching African politics at a South African 
university asked his class whether anyone would be interested in studying in Gaborone, Maputo or 
Dar-es-Salaam, his suggestion was met with a stony silence. That silence did not reveal displeasure or 
disagreement. Instead, the very idea that South African students would study elsewhere in the region 
had simply never occurred to them, as the subsequent class discussion revealed. Whilst one could easily 
dismiss these as simply revealing the South African elite’s ‘semi-peripheral’ orientation toward the 
‘metropole’, we assert that there is much more complexity to these cognitive processes.   
 Most states have a sense of belonging to a specific region and location. The phenomenon is not 
only material or geographic but also relational as the process of constructing a national identity in a 
specific territory goes hand-in-hand with a process of identification with and differentiation from 
neighbouring states. These processes of ‘identification’ and ‘differentiation’ expressed in role 
relationships shape states’ meta-narratives regarding being part of a region and distancing from others. 
In each case, these relational processes also involve expectations of other states that may make a certain 
state feel part of a region or alien from it.  
 In these regional dynamics, we commonly observe that certain states appear to be misfit within 
a regional location. There might be two underlying rationales for this. First, it may occur because a state 
feels that it belongs in a different part of the world cognitively speaking. Second, other states in a 
region may emit certain signals to the said state to treat it like an ‘alien’ state. Whilst there is no shortage 
of analyses on the politics of regions in International Relations, very little attention has been paid to 
states which perceive that they do not properly fit in the region they happen to be located in. These 
states ‘stand out’ not so much because of material capacities, but because they espouse an identity – 
manifested in different forms – in marked contrast to the states around them. For example, both 
Australia and South Africa have sought in different ways to reconstruct their identities towards being 
more ‘Asian’ or ‘African’ states respectively. Similarly, the Pakistani state has tended to distance itself 
from its ancient Indian heritage while attempting to associate itself more with an Arab identity. 
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 The primary question that this project will aim to answer is: what causes this process of a 
change in identity amongst states in different regions of the world? Comparing across regions, this 
research analyses why and how states reconstruct their identities in order to enhance or de-emphasise 
their degree of regional conformity. By examining a series of diverse cases that cut across the 
conventional developed/developing-state divide, this project conceptualises the phenomenon of 
‘misplacement’, including how and why it occurs and its implications. We aim to develop the notion of 
‘misplacement’ into an analytical tool of enquiry in order to show why these states’ governments 
and/or their societies feel less ‘connected’ to their geographical regions. Furthermore, we also examine 
why certain states seek greater or lesser regional assimilation and aspiration.  
 Though we commonly observe the dynamics of misplacements operating in several regions 
involving certain states, we do not have sufficient theoretical tools at our disposal to help us understand 
the key attributes of misplaced states. We do not know what strategies they adopt to deal with the 
persistent feeling of misplacement and what the implications of their efforts are. We also know very 
little about how these processes of misplaced identities are conceived and articulated by foreign policy 
decision-makers within certain states. Furthermore, there exists limited knowledge of how certain 
neighbours express their views about misplaced states. That may include certain types of foreign policy 
reactions from regional neighbours which may enhance or decrease misplaced states’ sense of 
alienation from their geographical region. Overall, there is a serious dearth of knowledge around the 
processes through which states tend to become alienated from the regions in which they happen to be 
located. This research analyses why and how states reconstruct their identities in order to enhance or 
de-emphasise their degrees of regional conformity. Developing the notion of ‘misplacement’ into an 
analytical tool, this special issue engages with the ideas of role theory to chart the cases of six countries 
on a continuum, studying the examples ranging from well-placed states at one end of the spectrum to 
extremely misplaced states at the other end.  
This conceptual note is structured in the following way: the next section situates the current project 
in the broader literature on regional identity. It shows that there are clear puzzles emanating from real-
life behaviour by certain states which highlight the need of academic conceptualisation. However, the 
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contemporary literature does not address that need. That section makes the case for studying the 
phenomenon of misplacement that has not been given enough attention so far. 
The third section presents a definition of what we mean by a ‘misplaced state’ and outlines some of 
its key attributes. We argue that there can be many types of misplacement – ranging from soft to hard 
misplacement. The third section also identifies how the phenomenon of misplacement can be mapped 
through a variety of tools. That section ends by looking at some of the common, real-life consequences 
of a state’s misplacement including loss of legitimacy, a reduction of the variety of roles available at 
their disposal and a disjuncture between their elites and the societies.  
The fourth section puts forward a theoretical model based on role theory for the study of misplaced 
states. That section helps us understand how the processes of role performance may intensify a state’s 
dissociation from its geographic region. We start that section by outlining the ‘layered model’ put forth 
by Hagstrom & Gustafsson (2015). We then move on to further clarify the relation between roles and 
identities. We argue that the ideas of role theory are better placed to help build a theoretical framework 
of foreign policy behaviour of misplaced statehood as opposed to the ideas of ontological (in)security 
and ‘liminality.’ The fifth section summarises the discussion and highlights avenues for future research 
on the subject. In that section, we also present a brief introduction of the remaining articles of the 
special issue.  
 
Regional Identity and State Misplacement  
Like any other endeavour for conceptual development, we should first address the puzzle. One 
might ask: what is at stake that needs addressing through a new concept of ‘misplaced states’? We 
believe that the need to develop this concept emanates from real-life state behaviour which shows a 
state’s alienation from its geographical regions. We notice that a such alienation from its region does 
not have simple, benign results – it often leads to conflicts and hinders cooperation.  
The empirical examples of the phenomenon of ‘misplacedness’ (and its negative repercussions) 
are visible in almost every region of the world. For example, the case of Pakistan shows that its self-
inflicted isolation in the South Asian region has exacerbated conflict with the neighbouring India and 
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has hindered regional cooperation multiple times. It perceives itself to be a part of the Islamic Middle 
East than an India-dominated South Asia. Pakistan’s misplacedness appears at its starkest when we see 
it as the only country in South Asia that portrays its competition with India in Islamist terms: it likes to 
see itself as a state engaged in a perpetual jihad against an ‘infidel’ and ‘imperialist’ India (Kapur 2017). 
Pakistan conceives itself as the only state challenging Hindu India’s domination despite the fact that 
there are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan. Other South Asian states (such as Sri Lanka, 
Maldives and Bangladesh) also have sizable Muslim populations. The fact that Pakistan does not 
acknowledge the presence of such a large number of Indian Muslims (and it does not associate with 
them) speaks volumes about how it really sees itself as an outsider in South Asia. It thinks of itself as a 
country comprising of a different type of Muslims.  
Pakistan’s misplacedness has also hindered cooperation in several regional forums. Importantly, 
it is not unusual to see Pakistan being completely isolated in the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC). For example, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Uri, India in October 
2016 which were widely believed to be perpetrated by Pakistani-supported terrorists, other SAARC 
members boycotted the SAARC summit meeting that was scheduled to be held in Islamabad in 
November that year. Pakistan has also boycotted the recent meeting of the Organisation of Islamic 
Countries in March 2019 over its invitation to India to attend the event.  
Other examples of being misplaced include Japan’s keenness before WWII to associate more 
with the club of the Western great powers (rekkyo) instead of associating with its region. It had limited 
diplomatic relations with the Asian states which were restored during the Cold War. We also witnessed 
in the case of apartheid South Africa that initially it sought to present itself as the bastion of ‘Western 
civilisation’ on the African continent with a strong societal association with Europe. It even tried (and 
failed) to become a part of NATO. The post-apartheid South Africa has made Africa the centre of its 
foreign policy and has actively sought to reconstruct its identity to ‘be’ African, by sponsoring 
numerous forms of regional institutional innovation (i.e hosting the pan-African parliament, 
rejuvenating the African Union), supporting peace-making and peacekeeping initiatives, and acting as 
the spokesperson for the African continent at global fora such as the G20 or BRICS. However, we 
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witness the prevalence of societal distancing from the continent in the form of anti-immigrant 
narratives connected to crime and drug trafficking.   
Where the feeling of being misplaced brings forward conflictual behaviour, the feeling of being 
well-placed tends to induce cooperation through the use of a state’s common regional identity. For 
example, we see in the case of Brazil that its attempts to promote regional integration is usually based 
on its credentials of a Latin-American state and a developing country surrounded by like-minded states. 
That shows that in contrast to a misplaced state, a well-placed state uses its commonality with the 
neighbourhood strategically, but also normatively since it bases its actions and discourses more in the 
common ideational traits shared with others than in the possible obstacles that regional integrations 
schemes might entails. 
The examples have highlighted the presence of a real-life phenomenon of misplacement in 
need of academic conceptualisation. Whilst the past ten years have seen an incredible proliferation of 
literature on regional identity, most of it has been about the construction of a regional identity with the 
overriding emphasis on conformity within the region, through institutions, norms or the convergence 
of markets.1 Although the current project is also about regional identity, it is of a very specific 
phenomenon which requires some contextualisation. Keating (1998: 86) argues that regional identity 
and its relation to political action is shaped by three important elements. The first involves ‘cognitive’ 
awareness: ‘people must simply be aware of a region and its limits in order to distinguish it from other 
regions’. The second is ‘affective’: ‘how people feel about the region and the degree to which it 
provides a framework for common identity, possibly in combination with class or national identities’. 
Finally, an ‘instrumental’ orientation which involves the extent to which a region is used as a basis for 
mobilisation and collective action to pursue social, economic and political goals. The missing link, 
however, remains the personal and collective dimensions of identity on the one hand and the histories 
of a region and the personal histories of individuals, which rarely conflate.  
                                                 
1
 The concept of ‘region’ is often contested but we employ the term to denote the cognitive and geographical space that 
a country physically belongs to. The concept of regions is often socially constructed through factors such as physical 
proximity, cultural affinity, shared social values, and a sphere of influence produced by a certain power (see Wehner 
2015; Koga 2017, 15). 
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 In order to help overcome some of these analytical challenges, Paasi (2002:139-140) suggests 
thinking about the institutionalisation of regions to link it with identity. He contends that the dynamics 
of institutionalisation involve four simultaneous processes. The first process relates to a region’s 
territorial shape – the boundaries that emerge through various social practices that ‘distinguish the 
region and identity discourses from those of other regions’ (Paasi 2002: 140). The second process 
involves the symbolic shape, which emerges through practices including the economy, culture, media 
and governance whereby the narratives of identity are constructed. These include the name of the 
region and other symbols. The third process relates to the institutions that are required for the 
maintenance of the territorial and symbolic shapes. Such institutions produce ‘us’ v. ‘them’ narratives 
and could also be located outside the region. The final process relates to both an internal and externally 
established identity through social practices and consciousness, whereby social groups and movements 
could be mobilised. It is this very process about regional consciousness which comes closest to what 
this project explores (hence the relevance of this paper’s opening vignette) but it does not fully 
conceptualise the phenomenon of misplaced state – the task performed by this project.  
This project’s main objective is to come up with a set of criteria that help us define a misplaced state, 
study the causes of misplacement and equip us with the tools to study the repercussions of a state 
believing itself to be misplaced. The next section will articulate the concept, showcase the types of 
misplacement and highlight some of the consequences of a state believing to be misplaced in the region.  
Misplaced states: Articulating the concept 
We conceptualise a misplaced state as a state that experiences a degree of (cognitive) dissonance 
between its geographic location and its cognitive sense of place. This dissonance manifests in a 
mismatch between a state’s national aspirations and the way other states recognise it. The incongruity 
between the Self and Others’ perceptions within a region is revealed through certain roles that self and 
others play or attempt to enact. While a state may be misplaced because of national identity forces, the 
external force of Others’ actions (external identity dimension) is key to understanding the 
misplacedness of a state in a region.  
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To further elaborate the concept, we contend that misplacement is not an end goal in and of itself 
nor is it a conscious, purposefully crafted desired state of affairs. Rather misplacement refers to the 
reactions of State A upon discovering that States B, C and D (within the region) consider it undesirable. 
Misplaced states seek to mitigate these reactions from (regional) Others and employ various strategies 
to do so. Ontologically the state of being misplaced comes into being once State A conceives of, or 
introduces various strategies to ameliorate Others’ sense of distance towards it. Mitigating 
misplacement is always an ongoing process, since State A’s tactics and strategies are not always likely to 
succeed and often involve or reveal contradictions and tensions.  
This dissonance also leads to cognitive dissociation which can manifest in real, institutional terms. 
This process is role based and involves the national role conception of the self and the role 
expectations of others. Yet these roles may or may not be accepted by others. Thus it is in the process 
of role location where we have the possibility to observe and comprehend the relational manifestations 
of a misplaced state with regard to its regional position. In other words, we believe that misplacement is 
a ‘real phenomenon’ that exists and can be substantiated through discourse analysis or narrative 
construction.2  
A key feature of a misplaced state is a mismatch between self and other’s perceptions within a 
region that takes form through an interaction of role and counter-role. Misplaced states are often at the 
centre of the processes of role differentiation initiated from within or outside these states. For 
misplaced states, role conceptions3 entail conscious strategies and narratives designed by policy 
entrepreneurs that promote cognitive dissonance between a country’s geographic location and its 
cognitive sense of self in that cultural space. While misplaced states can conceive roles that do not fit 
well within the existing regional social order, other actors from that regional social order also tend to 
reject the role conception of the self altogether.  
Though the move towards gaining a different identity is a journey to something ‘different’ or ‘new,’ 
misplaced states can also treat the journey as destination itself. It is entirely possible that misplaced 
                                                 
2 We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for this point.  
3
 We understand ‘role conceptions’ as the ego’s self-definition and the alter’s expectations regarding the role of the self 
(Harnisch 2011: 8) 
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states internalise “misplacedness” and their dissatisfaction no longer motivates them to immediately 
mitigate such ideational discrepancies. If so, they find stability in misplacement and some kind of peace 
in transition. They do not have to be at peace with themselves only if and when they achieve their 
objective of having everyone accept (and grant legitimacy to) their cognitive aspiration to belong 
elsewhere. The process itself is seen as journey as well as destination. The never-ending struggle may 
even end up becoming a permanent part of the identities of misplaced states.  
Misplaced states exhibit certain characteristics that are reactions post hoc (often observed through 
their discourses) than ‘natural’ features of misplaced states. At the empirical level, misplaced states can 
be expected to act according to one or more of the following ways to ameliorate their position. First, 
state elites may seek to connect to an alternative other. Such actions may include the creation of a new 
regional organisation, seek to re-define what constitutes the region or engage in initiatives across a 
variety of issue-areas to signal their growing self-identification with another region. Pakistan is an 
interesting example of a case where it has repeatedly sought to connect with the states in the Arabian 
Gulf, depicting itself as a Middle Eastern country. That has meant overplaying its Islamic identity which 
is the primary feature in common between Pakistan and the Gulf states. It is no surprise that Pakistan 
has championed the causes of Muslims in distant lands such as Bosnia in the Yugoslav Wars. Japan also 
redefined the boundaries of ‘Asia’ to emphasise Japan’s role in it through the Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere in the 1930s.   
Second, misplaced states might seek a closer alliance with a great power in the expectation that its 
closer relationship with the major power would compensate for its purported regional distance. One 
example would be post-apartheid South Africa’s move to further much stronger links with China, 
especially since 2009, through its incorporation into the BRICS. Considering that it is the smallest of 
the BRIC economies, it justified its status elevation on the basis that it could speak for Africa, both 
within BRICS as well as the G20.  
Third, misplaced state may seek to ameliorate how others project it as different, by providing 
regional or cultural public goods, thus ‘buying off’ neighbour’s dissent. The provision of development 
assistance, facilitating transport or energy infrastructure either on the basis of monetary sponsorship or 
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technical support, emerge as examples. Israel’s promotion of itself as a gay-friendly destination for 
tourists is an example of cultivating a positive image in the minds of the residents of the neighbouring 
states in the region. Fourth, rather than deny or downplay others’ consideration of it as ‘different’, 
misplaced states actually concede the point and construct a narrative which highlights the perceived 
misplaced state’s exceptionalism (most likely related to its history).  
Fifth, some misplaced states may draw upon a traumatic past to justify role conceptions that 
emphasise their distinctiveness from other states in their geographical regions. This trauma might relate 
to their birth, loss of a section of their territory, defeat in war or any other aspect of their existential 
history. The memory of the trauma for Pakistan and Israel constantly shapes their relations with their 
neighbours and also colours their aspiration to belong to a region different from their geographical 
location. Likewise, the collective memory of the trauma regarding Japan vis-à-vis China and Korea 
continuously affects its relationships and role location processes with its neighbours in the region. A 
traumatic past is also deployed by misplaced states to blame their neighbours for wishing them ill. The 
neighbours are perceived to have agendas to conspire against these misplaced states. Past traumas are 
often seen as instructive in convincing misplaced states to avoid their repeat in the future at the hand of 
the neighbouring states.  
Sixth, at times misplaced states tend to use their misplacement strategically to achieve certain 
economic or political gains. However, the adoption of a specific role to be accepted somewhere else 
can fail because external others to a region expect something different. Chile failed in locating a role of 
being an Asia Pacific state to join APEC in its first attempt because the significant others did not 
recognise Chile as such. This case shows that misplacement can be used to maximise benefits for the 
state through branding certain traces of an existing national identity or competing national ones. It also 
shows that although the phenomenon of misplacedness is relational (as a state has referential actors 
against whom it compares its degree of being misfit in a region), in most occasions it is self-driven. The 
self-side initiates the phenomenon and uses it as a policy option. 
Whilst reducing the consequences of both hard and soft misplacement is a constant struggle, 
these effects can be mitigated by the extent to which a misplaced state is both able to compensate for 
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its reduced influence and find new role locations outside its region, which is acknowledged by others as 
such. When misplacement is pursued as a conscious policy strategy by states for instrumental purposes, 
the effectiveness of such an approach can be assessed on the basis of strategic success or failure. 
Libya’s attempts (under Gaddafi) to recast itself - by choice - as more Arab than African and 
consolidate its Arab identity - provides a rare example of a failed attempt at changing identity (towards 
the Arab world) that nevertheless allowed Gaddafi to ‘return’ to Africa and recast Libya as an African 
state with relatively little resistance to pursue a strong leadership role. The strategies adopted by states 
to deal with misplacement are not always reflective of their cognizance of the consequences of their 
actions. In other words, there is a need to separate strategy from consequences. Most of the 
consequences are related to the responses of the ‘other’ to one’s actions. On the other hand, a failure of 
the strategy to deal with one’s misplacement can harden misplacement.  
Types of misplacement  
 Since unacknowledged recognition claims differ in terms of intensity due to historical 
significance (e.g. colonial legacy), past conflicts or trauma, we distinguish between three sub-groups 
located on a continuum of placement and misplacement. That means that among misplaced states, the 
degree of “misplacedness” differs. At one end of a spectrum we witness the case of ‘well-placed’ states 
while on the other end, we have the cases of ‘hard-misplacement’ or extremely misplaced states. The 
cases of ‘soft misplacement’ occupy a spot at the middle of the continuum.  
We assert that well-placed states do not face serious domestic or international contestations 
about the relationship between their geographical and cognitive positions in the world like misplaced 
states do. In such states, cognitive aspirations of the citizens to belong somewhere are the strongest 
regarding their geographical locations. Well-placed states are usually considered by everyone to be very 
well integrated into their regions and sometimes perform the role of leadership of their regions (e.g. 
Germany in Continental Europe or India in South Asia). It is important to note that their status as well-
placed states is also acknowledged by their regional neighbours, imparting them with a sense of 
cognitive certainty. Overall, well-placed states have a psychological sense of firmly belonging in a 
region. We identify Brazil as a well-placed state in this special issue. 
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 Further along the pendulum, we find soft (or moderate) cases of misplacement. In such 
situations, states feel somewhat misplaced but that element does not persist in the long-term or 
manifest much in their behaviour in the international realm. Lesser degrees of misplacement are 
primarily characterised merely by a cognitive aspiration with little or no institutionalised distancing 
from the region. For example, whilst post-apartheid South Africa is not only entirely regionally 
integrated in diplomatic, economic and security terms, it often takes the lead in those processes. 
However, in some societal dimensions, many South Africans (regardless of race) display an emotional 
aspiration towards the United States and Europe that is incongruent with the foreign policy espoused 
by government elites (Van der Westhuizen & Smith 2015). Yet, it is precisely the disjuncture between 
the official, high-level priority given to Africa against the prevalence of societal distancing from the 
continent in the form of anti-immigrant narratives connected to crime and drug trafficking that makes 
post-apartheid South Africa an example of soft misplacement, with little to no institutional distancing. 
Chile is a similar case, since Chileans tend to see themselves more as part of the West than part of Latin 
America. The regional aspirations of leadership are usually met with scepticism by internal elites, who 
prefer a country submerged in European values rather than be seen as Latin American. Similar to South 
Africa in recent times, this mild sense of misplacement in Chile is an elite-driven aspiration for 
development and higher standard of living idealistically observed in the West. Occasionally, Chile lays 
emphasis on the idea of South America and locates itself within that region. That strategy helps it to 
cope with its mild misplacement. The later Meiji period Japan in the late 19th century is another 
example of soft misplacement as it aspired to global status through rekkyo-iri (assuming the status of 
great power) because it did not consider the region to be independent or self-governed due to 
colonisation.  
Towards the end of the spectrum and in juxtaposition to well-placed states, we have the cases 
of hard misplacement. Such states consistently express their dissatisfaction over their regional setting in 
the long-run and act in order to detach themselves from the region to which they psychologically and 
physically belong. Misplacement resulting from historic domestic conflicts relating to religion, race, or 
ethnicity tend to be instances of ‘hard’ misplacement as the cases of apartheid South Africa, Israel and 
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Pakistan suggest. In these states, misplacement does not primarily reflect through mere manifestations 
of cognitive aspiration but can also affect interstate relations at a deeper, fundamental level to the 
extent that regressive regional relations become institutionalised through diplomatic and even military 
security practices. Equally, hard cases of misplacement at both regional and global levels (such as 
apartheid South Africa, Israel) would constitute extreme but rare cases in which cognitive dissociation 
from the geographic region is complete.  
Cases of hard misplacement tend to reflect institutionalised reactions by the misplaced state, such as 
its military and other agreements with states and great powers beyond the immediate region (examples 
include Pakistan’s military cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states; Israel’s defence alliance 
with the Western states). In cases of soft misplacement such reactions manifest in non-institutionalised 
settings or more frequently at a societal level (for example, the prevalence of xenophobic attacks against 
foreign Africans in the South African case).  
A state denoting the case of hard (or ‘extreme’) misplacement differs from a ‘rogue’ or a ‘pariah’ state as 
the former finds a cognitive home somewhere else in the world while the latter finds it hard to be accepted 
anywhere in the world. Where a misplaced state is misplaced by choice, the status of a pariah state takes the form 
of punishment – others turn a state into a pariah state. Whereas a misplaced state might have a choice regarding 
where it belongs, a pariah state does not have many choices. In the case of Pakistan (an example of hard 
misplacement), it can exercise the choice to revert back to its South Asian neighbours who are likely to accept it 
as one of their own. However, a pariah state may not have that choice. A misplaced state might seek (and gain) 
legitimacy outside its region, a pariah state cannot get legitimacy outside its geographical home. 
Mapping misplacement  
Despite the obvious ‘fuzziness’ of the term, the aspiration of a misplaced state can be mapped 
on a systematic, empirical basis. Doing so is necessary to understand who leads the phenomenon of 
misplacement. In order to operationalise the concept, it is necessary to first understand what types of 
the elite-society relationship that each state has. If a state is a more elite-driven polity, such as one-party 
democracy, a semi-authoritarian autocracy or a dictatorship, the method of the content analysis of 
official statements toward outside/inside the state will be useful to examine the state’s aspirations in the 
region. That is because such a regime tends not to incorporate voices and opinions from its society, and 
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a decision-making process is largely dominated by government elites alone. For example, Japan’s 
decision-making system during the inter-War period was very much dominated by the government 
elites, particularly the Ministry of Army and the Ministry of Navy, and their views on Japan in Asia (and 
the world) had the greatest impact on shaping its foreign policy. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand the elite’s policy and the status in a region that they aspire for.  
Conversely, if a state is more inclusive and the influence of its society is relatively strong in this 
state’s decision-making process, such as in a democracy, investigating the social views and social 
interaction with the government will be important. One of the most useful ways, but certainly not the 
only way, of mapping the emotional aspiration of a misplaced state is a public opinion survey. For 
example, when South African respondents were asked in which other region they would choose to live, 
Africa only appeared after the USA, Europe, China and South America (van der Westhuizen & Smith 
2015). A degree of regional ‘distancing’ is quite apparent in the public opinion surveys conducted in 
misplaced states and it increases with lower levels of education (Almeida, Carneiro, Onuki & 
Guimaraes 2015). Other, more qualitative means of mapping a society’s emotional aspiration include 
analysing: What narrative and concepts has the governments used to identify t country? How much and 
what type of priority do languages of the region enjoy within the misplaced state? To what extent does 
intra-regional student exchanges feature over those outside the region? How important is an 
understanding of the history of the region in high school history textbooks? Similarly, in university 
social science curricula, how prominently does the region feature over, say a focus on an extra-regional 
role model states (such as the United States or Europe in case of South Africa)? 
Consequences of misplacement   
 The cognitive aspiration to belong elsewhere has significant consequences for a state’s 
international relations. First, a common consequence of a state feeling misplaced leads to its lack or loss 
of legitimacy from the other states in the region where it is located. This may also culminate in a lack of 
esteem on the part of a misplaced state.  
Second, a consequence of misplacement is that the variety of roles available to an actor is 
reduced. The most obvious example would be thwarted leadership aspirations, with the degree of 
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misplacement related to the extent of leadership initiatives frustrated by others either in an ‘active’ or 
‘passive’ mode. In hard cases, active attempts could include various measures to counterbalance the 
misplaced state (including military means), whereas in more soft cases, the loss of leadership manifests 
in a misplaced state’s reduced soft power ambitions. Whilst misplaced states may remain key regional 
players in functional issue-areas, they may find their diplomatic and political ambit much more 
constrained. Israel is an example of a state that has occasionally attempted to exercise regional 
leadership roles, and repeatedly been thwarted in its attempts. On the other hand, Japan in the pre-
World War II period played a leading political role in Asia for a decade or so before it was rejected by 
external states. Pakistan also occasionally competes with India to get the recognition of a leadership 
role in the Indian subcontinent. However, in most cases, other significant states in the region 
(Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal) side with India. That further exacerbates Pakistan’s isolation in the 
region, making it look towards the Arabian Peninsula as its new cognitive home.  
Third, misplaced states can also suffer from severe societal/elite disjuncture. Such disconnect is 
a feature of many states but in the case of misplaced states, there can be situations in which states’ elites 
might push to cognitively associate with a different region while its ordinary citizens might not be 
inclined that way. It can also work in reverse, in which case the process might be led by the societies of 
misplaced states. In such situations, the elites might be forced to participate in the project without 
much desire. For example, the Arabisation process that Pakistan went through in the 1980s was very 
much state-led at the time when the country was under a military dictatorship. However, the 
contemporary dynamics of that process are more society-driven. A push by both sides may be more 
comprehensive but a disjuncture may still exist in such a situation due to the disagreement over 
strategies to be adopted to accomplish that aim.  
 Like much of the Constructivist literature we develop the concept of misplacement as a specific 
type or form of state identity that has not yet been captured by previous analyses. Working from the 
assumption that all states want to belong, misplacement seeks to reveal that some states seek to ameliorate 
their perceived sense of distance from their region as an ontological yearning – a task that is performed 
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here through the use of role theory. However, to do so we draw on Hagstrom & Gustafsson’s ‘layered 
model of identity change.’ 
 
A theoretical model of roles for the study of misplaced states 
We will begin developing our analytical framework by looking at Hagstrom & Gustafsson’s (2015) 
‘layered model.’ To capture change and continuity, identity should be considered as layered ‘and 
simultaneously constituted on mutually interacting levels of intersubjective meaning making’ (Hagstrom 
& Gustafsson 2015: 6). Hagstrom & Gustafsson (2015: 6) assert that ‘identity change in the less 
institutionalised layers interact and builds upon layers that are more institutionalised’. These latter layers 
are more ‘“solidly sedimented and more difficult for actors to politicise and change”’ (Wæver 2002: 31 
quoted in Hagstrom & Gustafsson 2015: 6). Stated differently, ‘more sedimented layers of identity 
construction can enable different identity constructs in less sedimented layers and even sharp turns in 
identity construction, but changes in the latter can also affect the former’ (Hagstrom & Gustafsson 
2015: 6).  
Three layers might be conceived in that regard: the most sedimented, fundamental layer is least 
subject to change (and is most institutionalised). At the middle layer, we find multiple identities that 
describe the Other and therefore also the Self. More exact distinctions and demarcations between Self 
and Other are negotiated, with some identities being more important in certain contexts and in relation 
to particular Others (Hagstrom & Gustafsson 2015:7). The issue of comparisons with others is at the 
centre of this discussion as that process promotes misplacement. Importantly, the process of 
comparison does not have to be associated with ‘negative and dichotomised imagination of difference’ 
– it can also include positive comparison and integration (Hagstrom & Gustafsson 2015: 7). Moreover, 
it is important to recognise that ‘all of a state’s identities need not be constructed in relation to external 
Others’, whilst some identities could be constructed as part of a collective identity with other states (of 
particular interest for our project) (Hagstrom & Gustafsson 2015: 7).   
The final and, the least institutionalised layer, ‘is where policies and specific political issues are 
discussed and where agents operate’ (Hagstrom & Gustafsson 2015: 7). For example, ‘the way in which 
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bilateral problems are discussed and understood’ has implications for identity constructions in other 
layers, especially the middle layer (Hagstrom & Gustafsson 2015: 7). The top, least institutionalised 
layer, is where ‘identity entrepreneurs’ – not unlike norm or role entrepreneurs – promote their desired 
versions of a particular identity, by calling attention to, or even creating ‘issues by “using language that 
names, interprets and dramatizes them”’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897 quoted in Hagstrom & 
Gustafsson, 2015: 7).  
The inability to resolve the discrepancy between their geographic and cognitive regions leads 
misplaced states to demonstrate aspirations (be they strategic or existential) to ‘belong’ elsewhere. 
Unlike most studies of regional identity, our focus is directed toward states that participate in the 
functional relations within their regions, yet their attention is sometimes or frequently directed 
elsewhere. Thinking of ourselves as part of an Other outside one’s own geographic region provides a 
degree of ontological security and reinforces the state’s aspiration to belong elsewhere. Such cognitive 
aspirations are at the centre of this attempt to make a state distance itself from a certain region and 
perceive to be cognitively located in a different one. As Hagstrom & Gustafsson (2015: 10; emphasis in 
original) assert:  
Identity is thus constructed through the forging of an emotional allegiance that makes us feel 
like we belong…[C]ollective identity is a matter of identification on the part of the participating 
individuals. It does not exist ‘in itself’, but only ever to the extent that specific individuals 
subscribe to it. It is as strong – or as weak – as it is alive in the thoughts and actions of the 
group members, and able to motivate their thoughts and actions. When one identifies with a 
particular notion, one feels part of a certain collective. It follows that without emotional 
attachment, identities are difficult to construct. In such a situation, identity entrepreneurs 
appear more seldom and are much less likely to succeed.   
  
The political elites of misplaced states (who can also be characterised as its identity 
entrepreneurs) are perpetually concerned with trying to resolve the misplacement by demonstrating 
how a misplaced state actually does fit in the region or by reconceptualising its role identities so that it 
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may be more properly considered part of another region. When there is dissonance between the Self’s 
actions and their self-identity or failure by the Other(s) to recognise such actions, the cognitive 
dissonance can involve feelings of shame or insult that drive identity change. The cognitive aspiration 
to belong somewhere else may be found at the societal level or at the level of a state’s elites. 
Identity and roles 
 We argue that analysing role-based relationships between ego and alter informs us about this 
process of misplaced identities. To be sure, similar concepts provided by constructivists examine 
cognitive mismatch that occurs within a state, particularly through the concept of ‘ontological security,’ 
which refers to ‘a sense of stable identity and continuity in one’s place in the world’ (Giddens 1984). 
Theoretical debates over ontological security have been significantly developed recently. Mitzen (2006) 
argued that if the routinised (negative) security relationship between a state and a significant other(s) is 
changing, such as in the case of security dilemma, the state would likely resist improving the 
relationship, as its security identity rests more on the routinised negative relationship. In addition to the 
importance of inter-state relations, Steele (2008) advanced a theoretical framework by examining the 
role of domestic self-narrative, arguing that the stability of actor’s identity can be disrupted by not only 
external factors, but also domestic debates. Building on these arguments, scholars currently examine the 
ontological tensions existing between internal and external factors and the causes and processes of 
sustaining and disrupting actors’ ontological security (Koga and Nordin 2019). For instance, Zarakol 
(2010) examines Japanese and Turkish reluctance to apologize for their historical crimes despite the 
existence of international political pressures and Zarakol argues that apologies would likely distort their 
state identity and thus prevent them from doing so. The corollary of this is that if the international 
community regards their inaction unjustifiable, the mismatch between actor’s ontological security and 
international opinions would create ‘misplacedness’ in the international realm. The concept thus 
contributes to clarifying one type of misplaced state.   
New research on Ontological Security has started to study the reasons and processes of why 
states may never feel totally secure; a phenomenon called Ontological Insecurity (see Browning and 
Joenniemi 2017; Steele 2017; Kinnvall 2004). States are in a constant quest to achieve such as security 
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and in this quest,  they would bring in new type of narrations to achieve a sense of regional belonging 
or to simply go extra regionally. The analytical value of the Ontological security literature (including the 
focus on Ontological Insecurity) notwithstanding, it cannot give a thorough account for the key drivers 
that make states to be regionally misplaced. Ontological security literature certainly helps to uncover 
part of the process of regional misplacedness, but it cannot provide a specific account of the type of 
actions states will take that amplify and sometimes tend to ameliorate their sense of regional 
misplacedness. Instead, role theory is better equipped to provide descriptive and conceptual 
explanations on the different courses of actions that a state and its political elite are likely and willing to 
take to cope with the ontological insecurity that the feeling of not being part of a region triggers in the 
state. Symbolic interactionist role theory has a micro dimension that links an actor’s actions to its 
identity and help us unveil the different role-based actions an actor could take to cope with its sense of 
being a misplaced regional state.  
Recently, Klose (2019) has opened a new path of research on the interplay of ontological 
security theory and role theory. He calls for a dialogue between the two approaches. Klose argues that 
role theory can account for process of how the self-image of ego disconnects with its own societal roles 
that are negotiated in the role-location process between ego and alter. This crisis of disconnection 
between the self-image and its societal roles can create an identity crisis of a high magnitude that brings 
the self to question its own sense of being. At the same time, Klose argues that roles can help provide a 
context in which such crisis unfolds (and how it unfolds) as well as how ego can create a new script or 
role to achieve a new sense of being ontologically secure. Ego can create new roles to achieve such a 
sense of being and feel ontologically secure again after a crisis of identity meaning. Ego has reflective 
intelligence or the ability to create new scripts by relying on role-making, role-taking and alter casting 
mechanisms and in this way stabilise itself in social environment. While Klose (2019) gives agency to 
ontological security by bringing in role theory assumptions and its descriptive and explanatory power, 
he shows that all actions of an actor are role based. Thus, while showing their complementarity, he 
shows how roles triumph over ontological security accounts. This is relevant for our theorisation of 
misplacedness and for our choice to opt for a role-based approach. As seen in the case studies of this 
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special issue, not all types and varieties of misplacedness are driven by a severe crisis of identity and 
thus ontological security concerns. Even when ontological security (or insecurity) is the driver behind 
all manifestations of misplacedness, Klose (2019) shows that the study of its external manifestations is 
not related to internal identity but role-based actions in a process of role-counterrole.  In this special 
issue, we are interested in concrete role actions actors take that create, amplify and reduce the 
misplacedness phenomenon of ego.  
More recently, the concept of ‘liminality’ is introduced in ontological security literature, which 
has the potential to develop the concept of misplaced state itself. Liminality generally refers to 
‘ambiguity and indeterminacy’ that ‘elude or slip through the network of classifications’ (Rumelili 2012: 
495). It identifies actors that are situated in between classifications, such as Western/non-Western and 
democratic/undemocratic. In ontological security theories, liminality is located within the concept of 
ontological insecurity, which refers to an existence of ‘anxieties and dangers’ about actor’s ‘identity and 
autonomy’ (Laing 1960, 39, 41; Kinnvall 2019, 285). With this concept, Malksoo (2019) argues that 
liminal actors are essentially insecure about their identities, and thus, they are ‘by definition 
ontologically upsetting for guardians of the existing order’ (366). If misplaced states are ‘liminal actors,’ 
then they would likely be disrupters in an international order. In this sense, the concept of ontological 
security and liminality would provide some analytical frameworks to understand the formulation and 
persistence of misplaced states.  
That said, the existing understanding provided by ontological (in)security and liminality is still 
unsatisfactory in explaining foreign policy patterns of misplaced states for the following reasons. First, 
ontological (in)security discussion would not be necessarily relevant in explaining the types of foreign 
policy behaviour that misplaced states would likely take. This is because while being diverse (Steele 
2019, 324-235), ontological security theories are generally less focused on explaining the pattern of 
ontologically (in)secure states’ foreign policy. Instead, they are more interested in a broader question— 
‘the importance of identity and memory for the production of security, focusing on the way identity 
and memory are produced and reproduced at the state level, for nation or society’ (Innes 2017, 381). 
Even if the literature touches upon state’s foreign policy decisions, the current theories tend to analyse 
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the internal factors of agents (e.g. domestic narratives that are affected by ontological (in)security) 
rather than its external factors (e.g. state’s strategy to manage its relations with their significant others). 
In other words, their research programmes ask different questions. 
Second, the concept of liminality, which has the potential to explain the foreign policy patterns 
of misplaced state, is still under-theorised. There are at least four issues with that pertaining to 
definition and conceptualisation. Firstly, scholarly consensus over the definition of liminality in IR has 
yet to be reached. It is unclear whether the concept focuses the static status of actor’s identities, such as 
‘betwixt and between,’ or their dynamic status, such as transition to a particular categorisation (e.g. 
Rumelili 2012: 495; Malksoo 2012: 483; Joenniemi 2014: 82). Secondly, liminality conceptually 
resonates with ontological insecurity, yet the concept of misplaced states does not necessarily match 
with those two. Given that some misplaced states are not necessarily ontologically insecure, by 
definition, misplacedness is not tantamount to liminality or ontological insecurity. Thirdly, the nature of 
liminal actors’ roles and behaviour has yet to be systematically analysed. While liminal actors can be 
disrupters in the exiting social structure, they are not always ‘upsetting’ for the structure because it is 
entirely possible that they can also achieve ontologically secure status as liminal actors. Fourthly, it has 
yet to be fully theorised how liminality produces a variance of actors’ behaviour. In this sense, the 
applicability of the concept of liminality to the misplaced state is still obscure.      
In other words, while ontological security and the concept of liminality are useful conceptual 
frameworks to understand characteristics and a particular behaviour of misplaced states, they still have 
difficulty in systematically answering some of our key questions: How are misplaced states created in a 
regional context? How diverse are those misplaced states in a certain region? What patterns of foreign 
policy behaviour would they have? 
In this context, role theory is able to better respond to these questions. In fact, role theory 
contends that roles capture the most important aspects of state identity since identity as used by 
constructivists does not imply actions from the actor. Who you are does not involve predispositions to 
act (McCourt 2012; McCourt 2014; Wehner and Thies 2014)? The behaviour of an actor can be 
comprehended and also observed through a role lens. Actors while acting in a social context, or setting, 
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do not bring their full identities to that setting; they just show a role or set of them that is counteracted 
with a counterrole(s) by the other or set of others. Wehner and Thies (2014) suggest that identity only 
implies behavioural consequences whiles role is used as a link between identity and action. Thus, roles 
act as a via media and link the who I am dimension of identity with a social context in which an actor is 
expected to show part of that who I am throughout a process of role-play. Nabers (2011) suggests that 
roles are the basis for identities and indicate behavioural predisposition of an actor. An actor’s roles 
allow for the process of identification from the other to the self (Harnisch 2011). Identity is relational 
and not pre-social since it is sustained, redefined and reproduced in day to day practices and routines 
within an existing social context (cf. McCourt 2014: 10). If identity is reproduced through role-play 
between ego and alter, then roles can also be understood from alter’s perspective as identity markers in 
foreign policy that tells significant others who that actor (ego) is (Thies and Wehner 2019). In this 
sense, the role-set of an actor – that is, the number of roles one possesses in one’s social life (Aggestam 
2006) – can be used as a proxy to capture the overall identity of that actor (Thies and Nieman 2017). 
Roles contain not only the national identity dimension of an actor but also the external one in which we 
can understand our identity in relation to others.  
 Role location and role-counterrole interactions  
Any role needs a counterrole to form a role relationship and complete the social act (Stryker 
and Statham 1985). Sometimes these role location processes take place in a regional setting in an 
antagonistic way (e.g., Thies 2013). To understand how the process of misplacement occurs we need to 
briefly review some key concepts of role theory, such as role expectations, role location and significant 
and general others. 
 On some occasions, as expected for milder (or soft) cases of misplacement, the self-side of the 
role conception becomes strong vis-à-vis the expectations coming from significant others or the social 
cues of the regional or the international system. Yet this does not mean that role expectations from 
others are irrelevant or do not influence the role conception since the self must always consider who 
among its potential significant others will partner with it to form a meaningful role relationship. For 
instance, the self may be pursuing a role that is rejected regionally but accepted in other regions or in 
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multilateral settings. In other words, role expectations from significant others are important in the 
making of a role for the self. Thus, role expectations refer to those expectations that alter ascribes and 
expects ego to enact (Kirste and Maull 1996: 289). A significant other is a primary socializing agent for 
ego (Thies 2001; 2013). A general other is the social system from where one’s own position and 
appropriated pattern of behaviour can be drawn by the self, placing itself in the shoes of the other 
(Wehner and Thies 2014). It is also important to note that the significant and general others are 
amenable to change and can be more like moving targets depending on international social situations. 
The cues emanating from the social system convey the intentions of the general other to the subject. 
This process of socialization guides the phenomenon of misplacement by attempting to reconcile self’s 
role conceptions and role relationships with others that meet with general approval by the regional 
audience of states.  
 Sub-regional systems and international ones may show contradictory expectations with regards 
to the most appropriate roles, amplifying the sense of regional misplacedness. In addition, role location 
describes the process whereby a social actor locates a suitable role in a social structure (Thies 2012: 29). 
The role location process has been described by Walker (1987) as the heart of foreign policy making, 
and by Thies (2001; 2013) as a socialization process. Drawing on Thies (2013), this article makes the 
case for the role location process as unfolding in geographic and cultural spatial context. Roles are 
specific to such contexts. For instance, states’ first role location processes involve seeking the sovereign 
state role (Thies 2013; Beasley and Kaarbo 2018).  That process has both geopolitical and cultural 
dimensions that are implicated in seeking and performing the social act of locating a new role as a 
sovereign state in a particular region. Moreover, different roles that identify a state with a specific 
geographic and cultural space can be internally and externally contested, which fuel narratives of 
misplacement and eventually gain the upper hand among leaders and foreign policy makers. As roles 
are context specific, then other roles of a state may indicate a geographical belonging such as South 
American state or Asia Pacific state, or cultural belonging, such as Western state, despite existing 
contestation. Such roles can be self-conceived and achieved or externally attributed by significant 
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others.  Both may experience severe domestic contestation which may result in the phenomenon of 
misplacement.  
A state may attempt to achieve a role that it has conceived for itself, or it may attempt to enact 
a role that is ascribed to it by others. Importantly, significant other(s) must ratify the role by adopting 
the appropriate counterrole(s). The audience of states affected by this role location process may also 
weigh in with their views on the appropriateness of the role, on the resulting role relationships as well 
as on how they are enacted. Most often this occurs in a regional context. It is at this juncture that a 
state can feel the distance and/or the rejections from regional others to the role selected. States may 
choose to stop pursuing their preferred roles, or they may even try to force them on others. The effect 
of failing to locate and interact with others regionally may also be minimised by seeking global or extra-
regional others as role relationship partners or by initiating a new role location process within the 
region to prevent excessive detachment.  
 We argue, therefore, that the main mechanism to trace misplacement is the ‘role location 
process where any role conception has to be completed by a counterrole’ (Thies 2013: 35). As 
mentioned before, a state’s experience of misplacedness is expressed through conscious strategies and 
narratives designed by policy entrepreneurs that promote some degree of cognitive dissonances 
between a country's geographic location and its sense of physical or cultural place. In role theoretic 
terms, role location process, in which one part of the role-counterrole interaction has sense of 
misplacedness, starts with an Ego’s conception that is fully or partially rejected by external role 
expectations. One feels that its cognitive and geographical neighbours do not agree with its own role 
conception. Since the term ‘role expectations’ refers to those expectations that Alter ascribes and 
expects Ego to enact. This mismatch between Ego’s conception and Alter’s expectations creates a 
sense of regional antipathy or non-acceptance within Ego’s role conceptualisations. The effect of failing 
to locate and interact with others is affected both by significant others’ and audience’s projections of 
counterroles in disagreement with Ego’s role conception. In this situation Ego’s policy entrepreneurs 
start to design narratives and strategies that seek to project one’s regional sense of belonging elsewhere. 
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A cognitive mismatch between these states’ aspirations of themselves and others’ expectations 
regarding them leads such states to adopt strategies to adaptively manage their misplacement.    
The interplay of the layered model of identities and roles  
The layered model of identity introduced above helps us to segment and observe how the 
location of roles and the role behaviour associated to misplacement unfold. In these layers both self 
and other interact to locate a role and counterrole interaction that makes the traceability of the 
phenomenon of misplacement possible. Since identity lacks motivational disposition and roles are the 
external faces of identity for an actor, then what it happens in Hagstrom and Gustafsson’s (2015) three 
layered model of identity is location and performance of a state’s different roles. Roles are therefore the 
primary manifestations of a state’s identity. For instance, the deepest layer of identity contains elements 
that constitute the most stable roles of a state as a corporate actor. It is expected that in this layer states 
experiencing misplacement will hold roles such as sovereign state, and others that have been part of the 
constitutive fabric of a state as international actor.  It is the middle layer where self and others interact 
more recurrently about the practice and reproduction of roles and their associated narratives of 
misplacement.  The most superficial layer involves role entrepreneurs attempting to initiate short-term 
changes in roles through reimagining a state’s cognitive region relative to the geographic region it 
inhabits. If change initiated in the most superficial layer takes root, then it is likely that such misplaced 
roles will become a relatively stable part of the state’s identity. 
 
 Outline of the special issue 
This conceptual note has introduced a new idea of a ‘misplaced state’. Though this 
phenomenon is the driving force behind a number of political and security challenges facing the world 
today, there is a limited understanding of what causes a state to feel misplaced and what strategies it 
adopts to try to associate with a region other than its own geographical vicinity. Given the dearth of 
literature on the subject, this piece is only intended to act as a primer and not as the final word on this 
subject. It will hopefully spark a discussion on this interesting but understudied topic which will lead to 
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further consolidation of the subject. Future research can focus on studying the causes and 
consequences of misplacement in greater detail and in their own rights.  
Where this conceptual note was dedicated to developing the concept of misplaced states, the 
rest of the special issue will apply these ideas to six cases that include Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, 
Chile, Japan and Brazil. These cases are selected for two primary reasons. First, they represent a variety 
of geographical regions across the world as they are situated in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, 
(South) Latin America and East Asia. Examining these cases provides us a contingent but refined 
concept of a misplaced state that will be applicable to most regions of the world. More specifically, six 
geographically diverse (and distinct) case studies can illustrate if there is a cross-culturally applicable 
concept of ‘misplacedness.’ Each case has different historical contexts and different regionally oriented 
social values. Furthermore, the comparative cases help us clarify what we mean by the terms well-
placed and misplaced states and how they affect these countries’ foreign policy behaviours. Second, five 
out of six countries fit our working definition of ‘misplacedness.’ They have unique cultural and 
historical experiences in terms of state-building, nation-building, wars, social diversity, and the 
international environment. Although the list of the countries is not exhaustive, examining these six 
countries is valid for heuristic purposes.  
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